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EFFECTIVE regulation of eviction, made necessary by the acute housing
shortage after the war, required an empowering statute sufficiently flexible
in its terms to enable the executing agency to deal with the numerous
arrangements invariably contrived to render inert restrictions1 accompanying
controls. Power to promptly meet potentially disruptive developments before
they took substantial shape was especially valuable because the occasion for
regulation was an emergency and hence even slight dislocations might
materially aggravate an already critical situation and cause considerable
hardship. Provision for such power had of necessity to be general, the field
regulated being comparatively uncharted and replete with numerous problems
which could not be foreseen with any measure of particularity.2
When the federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947 relaxed eviction controls
on residential accommodations, 3 the local legislature in New York City found
that a "serious emergency exists in New York by reason of the shortage of
apartments. Unless evictions from such accommodations are regulated, dis-
ruptive practices and abnormal conditions will produce serious threats to the
health, safety and general welfare of the inhabitants of the city. Action by
local law is necessary to prevent chaos and confusion resulting from such dis-
ruptive practices. ' ' 4 To cope with this emergency, the local legislature imposed
a general prohibition against evictions. A limited number of exceptions were
specified, however. One such exception was made where "the landlord be-
cause of compelling necessity, seeks in good faith to recover possession of such
apartment for his own immediate and personal use and occupancy as dwelling
accommodations." 5 A rent commission was created to carry out the enact-
tMember of the New York Bar.
1. See Matter of Cole v. Coster, 122 N.Y.L.J. 1627, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 13, 1949).
See also Commissioner Herbert Wechsler's provocative comment, Next Steps In Rent
Control, 5 THE RECORD OF THE Assoc. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 126 (1950).
2. Cf. GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND COMMENT 158 (2d ed. 1947).
3. 61 STAT. 193 (1947) 50 U.S.C.A. APP. § 1881 (Supp. 1948); see Willis, The
Federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947, 47 COL. L. REv. 1118, 1134 (1947); FINAL
REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY CITY HOUSING RENT COMIISSION TO THE MAYOR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, CONTROL OF EvICTIONS AND OF RESIDENTIAL RENTS By NEW YORK
CITY 4 (1950) (hereinafter referred to as the FINAL REPORT).
4. Declaration of policy in NEW YORK CITY LocAL LAW No. 66 of 1947, adding § U41-
7.0 to the ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF NEW YORK CITY; cf. declaration of purpose in D.C.
Code 45-1601 (1940).
5. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, § U41-7.0 (c) (2), as amended by N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW No. 12
of 1948, § 1. This exception was responsible for the great majority of applications for
certificates of eviction. FINAL REPORT 15. The other exceptions, provided as grounds
for eviction upon certification by the commission, were as follows: (1) Violation of an
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ment. Certification by it that a landlord satisfied one of the statutory excep-
tions was required before he was allowed to bring an eviction proceeding in
court.
This law, like other eviction controls which have used the term, 6 did not
expressly define "good faith." The term can be used with variety in meaning
under a varying range of circumstances. 7 While it clearly implies absence of
deceit or dishonesty, its meaning may extend beyond these minimal limits.8
The task remained for the commission, subject to review by the courts, to plot
the area of intended meaning for eviction control purposes. The process was
one of definition through application, for which legislative guidance was not
completely lacking. There was the background and purpose of the law, about
which the declaration quoted above appeared in the statute,9 and there was the
scheme of the law, showing an intention not to disturb the freeze in tenancies
except in narrowly limited situations. This background of intent was
obligation of the tenancy, other than an obligation to pay more than the maximum rent
or to surrender possession. (2) Commission of a nuisance, or use of the apartment for
illegal or immoral or other than dwelling purposes. (3) Alteration or demolition of the
premises under specified circumstances. (4) Occupancy of non-housekeeping furnished
accommodations in a dwelling which was not in a boarding house and the remainder
of which was occupied by the landlord or his immediate family. N.Y.C. ADmiN. CODE,
§ U41-7.0 (c). This law was thereafter reenacted by N.Y.C. LOCAL LAw No. 41 of 1948,
N.Y.C. LocA LAW No. 7 of 1949, N.Y.C. LocuL LAw No. 22 of 1949, and N.Y.C.
LocAL LAw No. 73 OF 1949.
For the comparable provisions under federal controls, see:
(1) Under OPA controls, enacted by the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,
56 STAT. 23 (1942), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. Ar,. §§901, 902(d) (Supp. 1950):
Eviction Reg. I, § 1388.532(a)(6), 7 FED. REG. 9133 (1942); Maximum Rent Reg. 60,
§ 1388.786(a)(6), 7 FED. REG. 10452 (1942); Rent Reg. for Housing § 1388.1181 (6)
(a) (6), 8 FED. REG. 14668 (1943). The last mentioned regulation appeared thereafter,
as amended, in 9 FED. REG. 11340 (1944), 10 FED. REG. 3441 (1945), 10 FED. RFG. 13533
(1945), 11 FED. REG. 12061 (1946). These controls were initially taken over by the
OHE after the OPA was abolished. 12 FED. REG. 2986 (1947).
(2) Under the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, stpra note 3, § 209, amended by the
Housing and Rent Act of 1948, 62 STAT. 93 (1948), the requirement of a certificate of
eviction was removed, and control of evictions placed entirely in the courts.
(3) The Housing and Rent Act of 1949, Pub. L. 31, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 206 (Mar.
30, 1949), amending the Act of 1947, restored control of evictions to the Housing
Expediter, who then issued § 825.6 of the Controlled Housing Rent Reg., 14 Fmn. REG.
1572 (1949).
6. See notes 4 and 5 supra for the District of Columbia and federal controls re-
spectively.
7. Compare, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 546 (1946) "(corporate reorganization), with Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (Supp. 1949).
8. See, e.g., In re Paloma Estates, Inc., 126 F. 2d 72 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 684 (1942); N.Y. Times, July 25, 1950, p. 30, col. 8 (lack of good faith in
collective bargaining).
9. See note 4 supra.
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significant in any case of doubt. 10 The commission's task was further directed
by the need for interpretation which would give effect to all the statutory
provisions and left none superfluous." Finally, in retrospect, the validity of
an interpretation might be tested to some extent by the action of the legislature
in later considering amendment or reenactment of the law.
12
Hundreds of cases came before the commission in which "good faith" was in
controversy. In each case resolution of the issue depended on the particular
facts and circumstances. Yet, with experience, most cases fell into distinctive
patterns. The manner in which the commission disposed of these cases repre-
sented an administrative agency's effort to adjust itself to the environment of
its operation. In the process, a concept of good faith emerged.
I. MISREPRESENTATION
The situations in which the commission found occasion to apply the good
faith requirement embraced several broad categories. The first of these in-
volved misrepresentation or dishonesty by landlords respecting legal prerequi-
sites for the issuance of a certificate of eviction.
Misrepresentation might be made in regard to particularized or "immediate"
facts, as, for example, the number of people comprising the landlord's family.
Proof of some of these immediate facts, such as payment of a specified minimum
portion of the purchase price in cash, was expressly required by the local law.'
8
Other immediate facts were asserted by landlords not as ends in themselves
but in order to lay a foundation for an "ultimate" fact, which the law required
as a condition to a tenant's eviction. One such ultimate fact was the require-
ment of compelling necessity, constituting a conclusion drawn from a complex
of immediate facts.
That there had been misrepresentation might be established by proof which
directly contradicted material allegations of the landlord. Thus, where a land-
lord claimed he was living in his parents' three-room apartment, misrepresenta-
tion, and consequently bad faith, was shown by proof that the landlord and his
10. See, e.g., Chittenden Lumber Co. v. Silberblatt & Lasker, Inc., 288 N.Y. 396,
402-3, 43 N.E. 2d 459, 462 (1942); 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNSTRUcTIoN §4704
(3d ed. 1943) ; cf. Cardozo, J., dissenting in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
433 (1935).
11. See Abbot v. Bralove, 176 F. 2d 64, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; SUTHERLAND, Op. Cit.
supra note 10, § 4705.
12. See Matter of Gilmore v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 283 N.Y. 92, 97, 27 N.E.
2d 515, 517 (1940). Reconsideration of emergency legislation after its enactment is to
be expected in view of the strong public interest. This was true of both local and
federal controls. See note 5 supra.
13. The local law required, where the landlord sought a certificate based on com-
pelling necessity, that he establish payment "to the seller, in cash, at least 20 per cent
of the purchase price under such sale or contract of sale, or 20 per cent of the assessed
value of the land and the entire building or structure thereon, whichever shall be greater."
N.Y.C. ADMIX. CODE § U41-7.0 (i). Federal controls have a comparable requirement
of 10%. Controlled Housing Rent Reg., § 825.6 (c) (1) (c), supra note 5.
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parents in fact lived in nine, and not three, rooms. 14 The sole adjudicatory
problem here presented was that of evaluating and comparing the probative
force of the conflicting evidence. 15 It was in such cases-direct proof of mis-
representation of immediate facts-that there was the least controversy in
applying the requirement of good faith.
Proof of misrepresentation might, however, depend on circumstantial evi-
dence from which an inference might be drawn disproving allegations of the
landlord. The assertions so contradicted might be either of immediate or
ultimate facts. Here too there was the question of the probable truth of the
evidence introduced. 16 But even assuming the existence of the circumstantial
facts contended for, there was the additional problem of the sufficiency of these
facts as a basis for the inference sought to be made. The validity of the infer-
ence under such circumstances was the source of frequent and serious dispute.
a. Compelling Necessity
The local law as first enacted did not expressly require a showing of com-
pelling necessity; like the federal eviction controls then in effect,' 7 it provided
for issuance of a certificate where the landlord sought in good faith to recover
possession of accommodations for his immediate housing use.' s The commis-
sion, however, required a showing of compelling necessity as a condition to the
proof of good faith. This was held in a number of cases to be unauthorized
under the statute and beyond the commission's powers.' 9 The law was then
amended, as the rent regulation of the OPA earlier had been,20 to require such
a showing explicitly.21 It became incumbent upon the landlord to affirm in his
application the circumstances showing the ultimate fact of compelling necessity.
14. Matter of Ladolcetta v. Finkelstein, 120 N.Y.UJ. 336, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 30,
1948). Cf. Matter of Curreri v. Coster, 122 N.Y.L.J. 825, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 13, 1949)
(landlord lived in six rooms and not in cellar as alleged); Matter of Mangiolomini v.
Coster, 121 N.Y.L.J. 929, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 14, 1949) (misrepresentation as to avail-
ability of accommodations adequate to relieve landlord's need). Similarly as to con-
sideration paid by the landlord for the premises. Matter of Bailey v. Coster, 121
N.Y.L.J. 1056, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 23, 1949).
15. E.g., Matter of Sevin v. Temporary City Housing Rent Commission, 120 N.Y.L.J.
219, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 9, 1948).
16. See Janise v. Bryan, 89 Cal. App.2d 933, 941, 201 P. 2d 466, 472 (1948).
17. Section 209 (a) (2) of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, supra note 3.
18. N.Y.C. LocAL LAW No. 66 of 1947, supra note 4.
19. E.g., Matter of Wallach v. Ross, 119 N.Y.L.J. 1034, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 19,
1948), rev'd, 273 App. Div. 1021 (2d Dep't. 1948), aff'd, 298 N.Y. 806, 83 N.E. 2d6 700
(1949); Matter of Lawrence v. Ross, 191 Misc. 88 (Sup. Ct. 1948), rev'd, 274 App.
Div. 781 (1st Dep't. 1948).
20. OPA Rent Reg. For Housing § 6 (a) (6), supra note 5, as amended Sept. 15,
1945, 10 FED. REG. 11667 (1945) (landlord "has an immediate compelling necessity to
recover possession of such accommodations for use and occupancy as a dwelling for
himself") ; see Lakowski v. Kustohs, 328 Ill. App. 557, 66 N. E. 2d 487 (1946).
21. N. Y. C. LocAl. LAW No. 12 of 1948, supra note 5.
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Landlords whose circumstances failed to meet the exacting standards of
need followed by the commission,22 might misrepresent their housing position.
Such misrepresentation might be established, as has been observed, through
direct contradiction of material immediate facts asserted by the landlord, such
as the nature of his quarters or the size or composition of his family. But proof
of misrepresentation might depend rather on the circumstantial process. Thus,
in Matter of Shidiack v. Finkelstein,23 a certificate was sought by a landlady
who lived alone in a second-floor apartment consisting of six rooms. She was
51 years of age, and claimed that the effects of a menopause syndrome made it
hazardous for her to climb stairs. She sought to evict a tenant who lived in a
first-floor apartment of seven rooms. In opposition, it was shown that the
landlady used the subway daily in travelling to and from work in a garment
factory, and that the tenant received a notice to move shortly after he had
inquired of the Housing Expediter about painting requirements. The commis-
sion denied the certificate and was sustained on judicial review.
In this case there was no direct proof that the landlady had misrepresented
her need. Instead circumstantial proof was used to establish two inferences:
(1) The landlady's mode of living showed there was no compelling necessity
either because she did not have the claimed illness or, if she did, it was not so
serious that she was unable to climb stairs safely. (2) The landlady's motive
in seeking a certificate was not relief of a compelling necessity but retaliation
against the tenant. This was typical of circumstantial attacks on allegations of
compelling necessity.24
b. Improper Motive or Purpose
The permissible purpose in seeking a tenant's quarters was narrowly
limited, even where an express requirement of compelling need was absent,
as has been true for most of the time under federal controls, even in the
absence of an express requirement of compelling need. It was not enough that
the landlord was under a compelling need or that he actually intended to use
the premises as a dwelling, and that these were factors influencing his decision
to obtain the tenant's eviction. It was required, in addition, that he be
motivated by a desire to possess the premises rather than to dispossess the
tenant. The required motive not only had to exist as a responsible cause but
had to be the dominating inducement behind the landlord's application. An
intent otherwise legitimate but born of a desire to dispossess nonetheless
22. See FINAL REPORT 15-19; Matter of Keller v. Finkelstein, 274 App. Div. 932
(2d Dep't 1948) ; cf. the statements of Commissioner Herbert Wechsler in minutes for
the commission's 134th Executive Meeting, May 10, 1949, and the 158th Executive
Meeting, Nov. 29, 1949.
23. 120 N.Y.L.J. 1410, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 6, 1948).
24. Cf. Matter of Slovikowski v. Coster, 276 App. Div. 971 (2d Dept 1950)
Matter of Kennedy v. Coster, 275 App. Div. 1057 (2d Dept 1949).
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disqualified him.25 Limitation on motive applied likewise to other, less
frequently used, grounds for eviction besides that of owner-occupancy. 26
The disqualifying motives most frequently encountered were found to
embrace two broad categories:
(1) Retaliation against the tenant. The presence of this motive was
usually indicated by a history of bad relations between landlord and tenant.27
While the inference drawn from such a background was, of course, to be
determined by the total context in which it was set,2s circumstantial evidence
relating friction to the eviction attempt was generally enough to bar the
tenant's removal. 29 When the friction was the result of the tenant's
insistence on his rights under rent controls, the landlord could succeed only
after a very clear showing that he was not motivated by vengeance.
30
(2) Profit. The desire for more money did not entitle a landlord to an
eviction certificate, 31 and disguise of this motive constituted bad faith. The
landlord failed where it was shown that he sought to evict in order to get
above-ceiling rentals.3 2  Similarly, both local law and OPA controls forbade
eviction in order to profit from a sale of the premises. 33  Evidence proving
25. See e.g., Gibson v. Corbett, 87 Cal. App. 2d 926, 932, 200 P. 2d 216, 220 (1948) ;
Matter of Anthony Lancieri, 4 PixE & FIscHER, OPA Ops. & DEC. 3321, 3323 (OPA
1946). This set of PixE & FISCHER reports will hereinafter be referred to as P & F.
26. Examples are eviction for the purpose of altering or converting accommodations
inhabited by the tenant, see note 5 supra; also, e.g., §209 (a) (4), Housing and Rent
Act of 1947, note 3 supra, and eviction for the purpose of withdrawing the premises
from the rental market, e.g., §209 (d), Housing and Rent Act of 1948, 62 STAT. 93
(1948). The local law was held constitutional in denying eviction designed to effect
withdrawal from the rental market. Loab Estates, Inc. v. Druhe, 300 N. Y. 176, 90
N. E. 2d 25 (1949).
27. E.g., Matter of Taschler v. Finkelstein, 120 N.Y.L.J. 1526, col. 7 (Sup. Ct.
Dec. 14, 1948). Cf. McSweeney v. Wilson, 48 A. 2d 469 (D. C. Mun. Ct App. 1946)
(friction following application for certificate of only slight evidentiary value).
28. See Colwell v. Stonebraker, 31 A. 2d 866, 867 (D. C. Mun. Ct. App. 1943).
29. E.g., under federal controls, Matter of Vincenso Piacente, 5 P & F 3079 (OPA
1946) (coincidence between dates of tenant complaint and landlord's petition for eviction
certificate); Matter of Abe Yeselson, 3 P & F 3472 (OPA 1945) (failure to move
sooner to remedy a long-existing alleged need); Lelek v. Baker, 309 Mich. 210, 14
N. W. 2d 838 (1944) (previous attempts to evict).
30. See, e.g., Matter of Rose Barotz, 3 P & F 3164, 3169 (OPA 1945).
31. See Gould v. Butler, 31 A. 2d 867, 869 (D. C. Mun. Ct. App. 1943). Serious
enough financial straits might justify the landlord's action. E.g., Matter of Perrone v.
Coster, 121 N.Y.L.J. 1566, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. May 2, 1949).
32. E.g., Matter of De Land Holding Corp., 4 P & F 3128, 3129 (OPA 1946).
Cf. Carrow v. Bishop, 50 A. 2d 598 (D. C. Mun. Ct. App. 1946) (reliance on need
for alterations).
33. E.g., Matter of Bloomfield v. Finkelstein, 120 N.Y.L.J. 432, col. 7 (Sup. Ct.
Sept. 14, 1948) (local law); Matter of Bernard J. Zuneska, 5 P & F 3298 (OPA 1947).
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an intent to sell ordinarily resulted in denial of a certificate,3 4 unless some
reason other than profit were shown for the desire to sell.3 5
There were occasions when landlords candidly admitted a disqualifying
motive. Thus, under OPA controls, one landlord testified in court that
"rather than have any question about the rent, I preferred to move in
there myself,"3 6 and another had assured the tenant that she was going
to evict him for "making trouble with OPA."37  It became evident, however,
that applications in which such confessions were made had little chance of
success regardless of the accompanying trappings. In doubtful cases, therefore,
disguise was preferred to disclosure. The common practice was for landlords
to confine their applications to a showing of a permissible underlying motive,
even though making the showing entailed distortion or dishonesty. The
deceptive facade might consist, for example, of an alleged desire to protect
health, or to obtain space for a janitor.3 8 In such circumstances the tenant's
opposing papers characteristically charged suppression of an improper
purpose.
39
When this occurred, the tenant had to depend on circumstantial evidence
to prove his point. The range of evidence was necessarily broad. Thus,
although there might be no obligation on the landlord to exchange apartments
with the tenant,40 refusal to make an exchange was one of the totality of
facts which might bear on motive, 41 and once made an offer of exchange
might by its terms provide evidence of bad faith.
42-43
Difficult cases arose where there were a number of occupied apartments
the possession of any one of which was adequate to relieve the landlord's
need. The local law at its outset did not expressly require him to proceed
34. See Matter of Bernard Zuneska, supra note 33, at 3299; cf. Matter of Elberg
v. Coster, 123 N.Y.L.J. 1131, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 30, 1950) (intent to sell shown
by public offer).
35. Cf. Matter of Logan v. Finkelstein, 120 N.Y.LJ. 1410, col. 5 (1949).
36. Brown v. Wood, 59 F. Supp. 872, 873 (N. D. Cal. 1943).
37. Matter of Eva Broch De Rotherman, 5 P & F 3083, 3084 (OPA 1946).
38. See, e.g., under OPA controls, Lakowski v. Kustohs, supra note 20 (health);
Matter of Vincenso Piacente 5 P & F 3079 (OPA 1946) ; ef. Matter of Joseph Fried-
man 5 P & F 3127 (OPA 1946) (janitorial accommodations).
39. Often no adequate proof of the tenant's position was available until after granting
of the application. Cf. Nyulassie v. Mozer, 85 Cal. App. 2d 827, 193 P. 2d 167 (1948);
Kauffman & Sons Saddlery Co. v. Miller, 298 N. Y. 38, 80 N. E. 2d 322 (1948). This
raised the problem of the power to reconsider the application. E.g., Matter of
Niesen v. Coster, 276 App. Div. 1076 (1st Dep't 1950).
40. It was held that the commission could not compel an exchange under the good
faith requirement. Matter of Anderson v. Coster, 122 N.Y.L.J. 305, col. 1 (Sup. Ct.
Aug. 22, 1949). The commission acquiesced in this decision. See statement by
Commissioner Herbert Wechsler, Item IVc of Minutes of 163d Executive Commission
Meeting, Jan. 17, 1950.
41. See Nofree v. Leonard, 327 Ill. App. 143, 148-9, 63 N. E. 2d 653, 656 (1945).
42-43. Cf. Matter of Shapiro v. Finkelstein, 120 N.Y.L.J. 1257, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Nov.
23, 1948).
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against one tenant rather than another. Although restrictions later confined
him to the course which would cause the least hardship,44 the choice between
apartments otherwise remained that of the landlord.4r The selection might,
of course, indicate an improper motive.46 But if his motivation in deciding
to repossess an apartment were proper, the landlord seemed free to choose
the apartment most advantageous to him.
II. EVASION
In the situations so far treated, the gravamen of the misconduct was the
practice of deception or dishonesty in the application to the commission.
The effort was essentially at evasion through deception in the application.
There was little doubt that such misconduct, where established, negatived
good faith.
In the cases now to be discussed, no deceit in the application itself to the
commission was necessarily present. The lack of good faith lay rather in be-
havior prior to the application. Even where there was full disclosure of fact
in the landlord's application, good faith was infringed in these cases because
of prior conduct designed to circumvent restrictions in the law by achieving
through indirection what was forbidden by more direct means. It was in this
area that the commission applied a concept of good faith especially indigenous
to eviction control, and it was here that there was the greatest dispute over
the commission's interpretation of good faith.
a. Self-Created Or Self-Continued Need
The commission did not believe that its duty to inquire ended with the mere
existence of compelling necessity, without regard either to the manner in
which the need arose or the cause responsible for its continuationY.4  If a need,
brought into being at will or through substantial contribution by a landlord,
sufficed to deprive a tenant of his living quarters, the joint aims of protection
of tenants and stabilization of housing conditions might well be undermined.
Tenants would then be assured of stability of living conditions only under
44. The law was amended to authorize eviction only from the apartment containing
the fewest occupants. Local Law 84 of 1948; Local Law 7 of 1949; Local Law 41 of
1949. The provision was allowed to lapse in Local Law 73 of 1949. There was some
question of the city's power to enact the requirement. Cf. F. T. B. Corp. v. Goodman,
300 N. Y. 140, 89 N. E. 2d 865 (1950). And the commission was dissatisfied with the
presumption of a correlation between hardship and the number of occupants in an
apartment. After Local Law No. 73, therefore, the commission issued a regulation
permitting eviction only of the tenant who would suffer least hardship. Amendment II
to Reg. II, Art. 2 § 5(b) (1) (Feb. 10, 1950) ; see FINAL REPORT 22-3.
45. See Item Vc of Minutes of 158th Executive Commission, Nov. 29, 1949. See, e.g.,
Rhodes v. Allen, 89 Cal. App. 2d 933, 944, 201 P. 2d 466, 473-4 (1948).
46. See, e.g., Chairman Coster's statement in Minutes, mepra note 45.
47. See statements of Commissioners Wechsler, Sorldn, and Coster, Item IX of the
168th Executive Commission Meeting, Feb. 24, 1950.
1951]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
very limited circumstances. In essence, there would be added as grounds
for eviction as many causes as might prompt a landlord to seek a tenant's
eviction and might therefore be responsible for the creation or continuation of
a need.
An example of this type of control arose in Matter of Engel v. Finkel-
stein. 48 The landlady lived in an adequate apartment in a house owned by her
sister, but wanted to repossess her own house. To achieve this she consented
to issuance of an order of eviction against her in a summary proceeding
brought by the sister. Then, asserting a need for housing, she applied for a
certificate. The commission found the need to be self-created, and good faith
therefore not established. The Appellate Division sustained, holding the
commission's determination to have been a proper exercise of its discretion.
Similarly, in Matter of Inber v. Coster,49 the landlord exchanged an adequate
apartment for an inadequate one, the limitations of which he knew at the time
of the exchange. In sustaining denial of a certificate, the reviewing court
found that it was safe to assume that the legislature did not intend a certificate
to issue under such circumstances. 0
A voluntary sale by a landlord of the premises at which he resided was an
alternative method of surrendering satisfactory quarters. Compelling neces-
sity resulting from such a disposition did not justify granting a certificate.
As noted above,5 ' a tenant's eviction could not be obtained just to put the
landlord in a better position to sell the premises. There seemed to be little
distinction in substance between that situation, where the tenant lived in the
house to be sold, and the situation in which instead the landlord lived there.
The tenant's eviction appeared equally in both situations to do no more than
facilitate the landlord's sale. Denial of a certificate under such circumstances
was sustained by the Appellate Division in Matter of Clemente v. Finkel-
stein," and in numerous cases by the lower courts.
3
Besides creating his own need, a landlord might show lack of good faith
by unnecessarily continuing a validly created need. For example, lack of good
faith was found and certificates denied where a vacant suitable apartment was
rented out instead of being occupied by the landlord ;54 where he obtained a
48. 275 App. Div. 779 (2d Dep't 1949).
49. 123 N.Y.L.J. 1285, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 12, 1950).
50. Federal controls have not required compelling necessity as a condition for eviction,
except for a brief interlude under OPA regulation. See notes 5 and 20 supra. No "self-
created need" doctrine was developed. See Lester v. Beer, 74 Cal. App. 2d 984, 990, 168
P. 2d 998, 1002 (1946).
51. See note 33 supra.
52. 274 App. Div. 1069 (2d Dep't 1949).
53. E.g., Matter of Zabriskie v. Finkelstein, 121 N.Y.L.J. 1001, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.
Mfar. 18, 1949).
54. E.g., Mangiolomini v. Coster, 121 N.Y.L.J. 929, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 14, 1949).
Compare Commissioner Wechsler's comment, Item IIIb of Minutes of 131st Executive
Commission Meeting, Apr. 19, 1949, apparently attempting to draw a distinction between
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certificate and then sold the house concerned instead of proceeding to satisfy
his need by evicting the tenant ;O5 and where he refused another tenant's offer
to make adequate space available to him. 6  Similarly, refusal to exchange
accommodations, might result in a disqualifying self-continued need.
57
The need asserted by a landlord very often was created or continued in
order to provide housing space for persons other than himself or members of
his family unit. Married children, parents and other relatives were typical
objects of his bounty. The local law prohibited issuance of certificates to
landlords for the benefit of such persons,5 8 and analogous, although less
stringent, restrictions have been adopted in other eviction controls.ro Land-
lords attempted to evade this prohibition by allowing them to use accommo-
dations he could have occupied himself, and then alleging his own resulting
need as a basis for obtaining other accommodations. Such efforts were
unsuccessful where the landlord either had failed to move into an available
apartment 0 or had vacated one.0 1 In other cases the landlord allowed relatives
to move with him into an available apartment, and then claimed compelling
necessity because of overcrowding. Thus, in Matter of Urgo v. Coster, 2 a
son, who was engaged to be married, bought a house in which a five-room
apartment was vacant. His brother and sister-in-law moved in with him and
his parents, who had already been living with him. Shortly afterwards the
son married, and then applied for a certificate. Denial on the ground of lack
of good faith was sustained by the Appellate Division. The same result
passive non-action and affirmative action. This statement construed the self-created
need principle more narrowly than the later expressions cited note 47 supra.
55. Matter of Galati v. Coster, 121 N.Y.L.J. 1296, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 11, 1949).
56. E.g., Matter of Ingegno v. Coster, 122 N.Y.L.J. 1505, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 5,
1949).
57. E.g., Matter of Knappe v. Coster, 122 N.Y.L.T. 1014, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 27, 1949).
58. See note 5 supra; Matter of Prete v. Finkelstein, 274 App. Div. 905 (2 Dep't
1948).
59. See Housing and Rent Act of 1948, § 204 (a), supra note 5 (permitting eviction
for the landlord's own occupancy or "a member or members of his immediate family");
N. Y. Laws of 1950, c. 250, § 12(f) (similar limitation) and the regulation thereunder,
Rent and Eviction Reg. of N. Y. State Temporary Housing Rent Commission (1950),
§55 (1) (defining "immediate family" to include only a son, daughter, father or
mother); Cicchino v. Biarsky, 26 N. J. Misc. 300, 61 A. 2d 163 (1948). The "immedi-
ate family" restriction did not exist in the OPA regulations and the Housing Rent Act
of 1947, and decisions under those controls allowed landlords to recover possession for
other than their own personal use. See, e.g., Di Paola v. Seppala, 336 II. App. 344,
83 N. E. 2d 889 (1949); Ucci v. McBrian, 190 Misc. 14 (City Ct. 1947); but cf.
Lelek v. Baker, 309 Mich. 210, 14 N. W. 2d 838 (1944); OPA Interpretation 6(b) (2)-
VIII (3), 12 FED. REG. 123 (1947).
60. E.g., Matter of Gardella v. Ross, 274 App. Div. 889 (2d Dep't 1948).
61. E.g., Matter of Calabro v. Coster, 90 N.Y.S. 2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
62. 275 App. Div. 951 (2d Dep't 1949). See also, e.g., Matter of Vinti v. Finkelstein,
275 App. Div. 956 (2d Dep't 1949).
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followed where the landlord permitted relatives to move into an apartment
in which he was already residing.
3
Conduct creating or unnecessarily continuing a compelling necessity, how-
ever, did not invariably defeat an application. The landlord might justify his
conduct, or establish that it was not designed to be evasive.64 For example,
sale of a house while the owner was confined to a mental hospital without ap-
parent prospect of release would not preclude an application for a certificate
made after discharge from the institution.65 In a number of cases a landlord
justified disposition of suitable living facilities by showing a reasonable ex-
pectancy that other quarters would become available.6
Assuming debarring conduct without justification at some time in the past,
the question arose how long the landlord was to remain disqualified on that
account. In the Urgo case denial of a certificate was made a year after the
conduct in question.67 In some instances, longer intervals had elapsed.
8
Where, however, there is a break in the causal chain between the condemned
conduct and the need on which the application is based, the conduct would
no longer seem to be a bar to obtaining a certificate. For example, the need
responsible for the application may be significantly different from the one
that was self-created and may have arisen from independent circumstances.69
A proximate cause rationale seems a reasonable way of limiting the effect
of the banned conduct even where the chain of physical causation remains
unbroken. Past misconduct should not be deemed the proximate cause of
the landlord's plight where consideration of all the circumstances, in view of
the control program, makes it equitable to cut short the landlord's need.
70
b. The Seller-In-Possession Problem
A substantial part of the housing subject to local controls consisted of
quarters in small homes in which the owners resided. According to the 1940
63. E.g., Harmis v. Coster, 123 N.Y.L.J. 295, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 24, 1950). Cf.
N. Y. Times, July 21, 1950, p. 4, col. 5.
64. See statement of Commissioner Wechsler, Item IX of Minutes of 168th Executive
Commission Meeting, Feb. 24, 1950; statements cited in note 47 supra.
65. Matter of De Mori v. Finkelstein, 121 N.Y.L.J. 107, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 10, 1950).
Cf., e.g., Matter of Esposito v. Wechsler, 121 N.Y.L.J. 1711, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. May 12,
1949) (giving up of quarters during separation; application after reconciliation approved) ;
Matter of Tonetti v. Coster, 121 N.Y.L.J. 1525, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 1949)
(surrender of quarters due to sale of business).
66. E.g., Menahem v. Coster, 88 N.Y.S. 2d 509 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
67. Note 62 supra. The landlord bought the house in question in November 1947. He
applied for a certificate in September 1948. The commission denied the application in
December 1948. See the record on appeal, folios 51-7 and 100-104.
68. Matter of Meissner v. Finkelstein, 120 N.Y.L.J. 888, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 22, 1948)
(2 years); Matter of Zabriskie v. Finkelstein, 121 N.Y.L.J. 1001, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 18,
1949) (1GY2 years).
69. Cf. Matter of Doran v. Coster, 123 N.Y.L.J. 1052, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 24, 1950).
70. See Matter of Aluisi v. Finkelstein, 82 N.Y.S. 2d 569, 570 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
[Vol. 60: 600
GOOD FAITH AND EVICTION CONTROL
census statistics for New York City, owners dwelled in 90,157 two-family
houses and 24,204 three-family houses, as well as in a considerable number
of small homes with a larger number of apartments. 71 The post-war housing
shortage produced a boom market in such properties. 72 Unprecedented real
estate prices offered strong inducement to owners of pre-war houses to sell
out at a sizable profit. The rent control acts gave added stimulus to this
trend by restricting the extent to which the housing shortage could be ex-
ploited to enhance income. One large deterrent to any sale, however, was
the fact that the sellers would themselves become exposed to the shortage.
73
The seller-in-possession device was developed to eliminate this obstacle.
Because of the great demand for housing, a prospective seller was able to
insist that the buyer agree to leave the seller in possession of the rooms he
occupied. This caused the buyer, in order to satisfy his own housing need,
to seek the eviction of a tenant. Under such an arrangement the sale was
consummated at the expense of the tenant-he was to be put out so that
the seller might realize his inflated profit without loss of possession. The
threat of eviction by this method, moreover, could be used to obtain con-
cessions in violation of the emergency controls.
74
To permit such arrangements would have promoted evictions and threat-
ened the housing security of a large number of tenants. If an owner desired
to capitalize on the current inflated market, he, rather than the tenant, should
bear the hazards involved in surrender of possession. Fixing the risk in
this manner would limit such sales to situations where the sellers had
provided for their own future housing needs,7" thus keeping to a minimum
the disruptive effect on the housing situation.
The commission considered seller-in-possession arrangements to be contrary
to the aims of the emergency law to protect tenants and stabilize housing, and
it relied on the requirement of good faith as the statutory basis for exercising
71. U. S. DEPT. OF CommERC, BUREAU OF CENSUS, HOUSING STATISTICS, Vol. 2,
part 4, table 4, p. 272 (1943). There was also a large number of small homes in which
the owners did not reside in 1940. Ibid. It is likely that some of these subsequently
became owner-occupied.
72. See, e.g., New York Post, Apr. 7, 1950, p. 49, col. 1. It has been reported
that the average house which sold for $6,000 in 1941, sold for $12,475 in 1948, and
$11,540 in 1950. N. Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1950, § 8, p. 1, col. 8; also see The Housiog
Situation (The Factual Background) in U. S. HOUSING AND HOmE FINANCE AGENCY
22 (June 1949).
73. A seller remaining in occupancy ran the risk of being considered not a "tenant"
for eviction control purposes, and hence subject to eviction without a certificate. See
Matter of Vogel v. Finkelstein, 82 N.Y.S. 2d 861 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
74. See statement of the Office of Price Administration, 14 P&F, OPA Service 200:
372 (1944); 816 Fifth Ave. v. Leonard, 188 Misc. 728, 732 (Mun. Ct. 1947).
75. Cf. Edwards v. Finkelstein, 121 N.Y.L.J. 233, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 19, 1950)
(seller alleging that he would not have sold if had known that it would later be
possible to evict him).
1951]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
control. Thus, when the landlord in Matter of Keller v. Finkelstein"
applied to the commission for a certificate under the compelling necessity
exception, his application was denied because he proceeded against the tenant
of a two-family house rather than the seller who was left in possession
pursuant to the terms of the sale. In all other respects the applicant con-
formed to the requirements for a certificate. The Appellate Division, Second
Department, sustained the commission's denial and stated that it was not
"capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable, and the court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the commission."
After the Keller decision, the same court reaffirmed its position on three
separate occasions over a period of a year and a half. These cases illus-
trate the flexibility with which the seller-in-possession arrangement could
be used to evade eviction control. In Matter of O'Neill v. Finkelstein,"
the purchaser bought a one-half interest in a two-family house owned by a
friend. In Matter of Minio v. Finkelstein,7" a brother and sister joined to
buy a one-half interest in a two-family house owned by their aunt. In both
cases, as in the Keller case, the sale was preceded by a history of friction
between the sellers and the remaining tenants.7 9 When, shortly after the
sales, the buyers applied for certificates to evict the tenants, the commission
denied their applications because the sellers were still in possession. The
Appellate Division, Second Department, unanimously sustained both deci-
sions. And more recently the same result was reached where not the seller,
but a third party, was left in possession. In Matter of Santoro v. Finkelstein,"°
the buyer agreed, at the seller's insistence, to leave the seller's son in
possession of an apartment in a two-family house. Denial of a certificate for
the eviction of the remaining tenant was again sustained by the Appellate
Division.
It was not until the first three of these decisions had come down, that the
question came before the Appellate Division, First Department. In one case,
Matter of Stahl v. Coster8l the buyer granted the seller, as a condition to
the sale of an eleven-family house, a five-year lease for the apartment occupied
by the seller. The buyer then sought the eviction of one of the tenants. In
a second case, Matter of Rosenbluth v. Finkelstein,8 2 the purchaser bought
a three-family house for $23,000. The seller, at that time occupied one
apartment; the seller's parents occupied a second apartment; and the third
76. 274 App. Div. 890 (2d Dep't 1948). But cf. Kole v. Kousnetz, 335 Ill. App. 123,
80 N. E. 2d 451 (1948).
77. 275 App. Div. 720 (2d Dep't 1949).
78. 275 App. Div. 964 (2d Dep't 1949).
79. See folios 70-77 of the record on appeal in the Keller case; folios 77-84 of the
record on appeal in the O'Neill case; and folios 89-90 of the record on appeal in the
Minio case.
80. 276 App. Div. 930 (2d Dep't 1950).
81. 276 App. Div. 762 (1st Dep't 1949).
82. 276 App. Div. 115 (1st Dep't 1949).
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one was occupied by a tenant. There was a history of friction between
seller and tenant. The seller refused to make the sale unless the buyer
granted leases both to him and his parents. There was no evidence that
the buyer was unable to buy another house adequate for his needs and free
of such conditions. He chose, however, to make this purchase, and he
executed the leases. He then sought to evict the tenant of the remaining
apartment.
The commission denied certificates in both cases. The Appellate Division
reversed both determinations, unanimously in the Stahl case and by a
three-to-two vote in the Rosenbluth case. The judges dissenting in the
Rosenbluth case conceded that the question of good faith was one to be
decided in each case on its facts and circumstances rather than on a "general
policy," and that the commission had erred on the facts of the Stahl case.
They felt, however, that the Rosenbluth facts, particularly the small number
of apartments in the house purchased, were significantly different and did
provide a reasonable basis for the commission's denial. The commission
accepted the Stahl decision8 3 and the distinction drawn by the Rosenbhtth
dissent. A regulation was issued shortly thereafter restricting the seller-in-
possession principle to cases where the purchased premises contained four
or less apartments.8 4
In the Rosenbluth case, however, an appeal was taken to the Court of
Appeals. The Court affirmed8 5 on the ground that the "mere fact" of a
seller-in-possession arrangement could not show bad faith.8 6 The dissent
felt there was a factual basis for the commission's denial, and that it ought
to be sustained "unless the courts are to undertake a plenary review of such
administrative decisions." 8''  The Court's decision does not seem to rule out
all possibility of a valid finding of lack of good faith based principally on
the fact of a seller left in possession, provided that such a finding were based
on more than that "mere fact." The Minio cases7 is a possible example,
where there were, in addition, such facts as the relationship between buyer
and seller and conveyance of only a fractional interest.
The commission took the view that, even if the Rosenbiuth case meant that
the good faith rationale was not available as a means of controlling the seller-
in-possession problem, some control could still be effected through the rule
83. Item IVb of Minutes of 159th Executive Commission Meeting, Dec. 6, 1949.
84. The following provision was added to the commission's Regulation I, Art. II, § 5
(b) (1) by Amendment 11, effective Feb. 10, 1950: "The Commission may deny the
application of a purchaser of a building containing four (4) or less apartments, who seeks
to recover possession of an apartment, other than an apartment occupied by the seller,
where the apartment occupied by the seller is equally suitable and adequate for the
purchaser."
85. 300 N. Y. 402, 91 N. E. 2d 581 (1950).
86. 300 N. Y. at 405, 91 N. E. 2d at 582.
86a. 300 N. Y. at 406-7, 91 N. E. 2d at 583.
87. Note 78 supra.
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making power conferred on it by the statute to "effectuate the purposes"
of the law.88 This was the basis for the regulation it adopted after the
adverse decision of the Appellate Division in the Rosenbluth case.8 9 The
commission did not have an opportunity to clarify either the implications
of the Rosenbiuth decision or the efficacy of the regulation. Shortly after
that decision was made, local controls were terminated in favor of a state
program of controls.90
III. SPURIOUS TRANSFERS
The local law permitted issuance of a certificate only to the landlord 91 of the
premises, and then only for his own personal use. Consequently, as has been
noted,92 a landlord was unable to evict a tenant for the benefit of a child or
relative. The result was an appreciable number of conveyances to children
and relatives in need of housing, followed by applications by them for
certificates. Added incentive for such conveyances existed where there
were strained relations between the transferor and the tenant. The commis-
sion was again faced with the problem of controlling lawful transactions whose
raison d'8tre was to skirt the eviction controls.
These conveyances, of course, might raise issues of misrepresentation.
They also presented problems of evasion. It was a simple matter for a
landlord and his kin to arrange for a transfer of title, and to display all the
formal indicia customarily accompanying a change in ownership. It was no
more difficult to condition the transaction on some covert understanding that
the conveyance would be recognized by them only to the extent and for the
period necessary to prevent operation of eviction regulation. For example,
they might contemplate a reconveyance to the transferor at some undeter-
mined time in the future, after the purpose of the transfer-eviction of the
tenant-had been safely accomplished. The fact that consideration had
been exchanged was no obstacle, since that too might later be returned.
Direct detection of such a compact was practically impossible under the best
of circumstances. It was made even more difficult by the commission's heavy
work load, which did not permit sleuth-like investigations to ferret out elusive
understandings. It was therefore necessary in such cases to have recourse
to the circumstantial process, applied in the light of the commission's
experience.
88. See FINAL REPORT 21.
89. See note 84 supra.
90. N. Y. Laws of 1950, c. 250. The state program discontinued federal controls as
well, under the option granted by the Housing and Rent Act of 1949, 50 U. S. C. A. APP.
§1894 (j).
91. The local law defined "landlord" as "An owner, lessor, assignee or any other
person receiving or entitled to receive rent for the use of or occupancy of any apartment
as herein defined or any agent of the foregoing." N. Y. C. AD MIN. CODE § U41-7.0 (b) (4).
92. See note 58 supra.
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The two components of spurious transactions-evasion and misrepresenta-
tion-were not generally separated and identified analytically by either the
commission or the courts. 93 They were rather approached as an interwoven
whole. Typical circumstances recognized by the lower courts in sustaining
denials of certificates to transferee-relatives included: (1) Unsuccessful
attempts at eviction prior to the transfer in question. 94 Absence of such
attempts did not necessarily prove the good faith of the transfer since, with
time, landlords learned to forbear from making attempts which were likely
to prove unsuccessful. (2) A close relationship between transferor and trans-
feree. 5  (3) A history of friction between transferor and tenant prior to the
transfer. (4) Conveyance of only a partial interest in the premises to the
transferee. 96 (5) Suspicious circumstances surrounding transferee's payment
of consideration or the source of the funds allegedly used to make the
payment. 97 Where no consideration was paid, the transaction was particularly
suspect;98 it was given effect, however, where the gift was clearly felt not
to have been made to circumvent the law.99
Two cases of this kind came before the appellate courts. In Matter of
Goodman v. Coster,0 0 a sale was made by a mother to two sons after she
had unsuccessfully sought to evict a tenant for the benefit of one of them.
She had adequate space for them in another house she owned, but did not
make it available to them. The sons made a minimal cash down-payment;
the sales price was lower than the cost to the mother and less than the amount
at which she had listed the property with real estate agents. The Appellate
Division, Second Department, ruled that these facts did not show a failure
to proceed in good faith, although it sustained denial of the certificate on another
ground. In Matter of Maklary v. Coster,101 the sale was by a father to his
son. For several years the son had been in need of larger quarters, but
93. The first articulated awareness of a line between these two elements appeared in
statements of Commissioner Wechsler in discussing the Britton case, infra note 99. Item
IV d, Minutes of 155th Executive Commission Meeting, Oct. 25, 1949.
94. E.g., Matter of Pfister v. Finkelstein, 120 N.Y.L.J. 1292, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Nov.
26, 1948).
95. E.g., Matter of Berlucchi v. Coster, 122 N.Y.LJ. 1280, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Nov.
17, 1949).
96. E.g., Matter of Sefarian v. Finkelstein, 120 N.Y.L.J. 1220, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Nov.
19, 1948).
97. E.g, Matter of Romeo v. Coster, 123 N.Y.L.J. 516, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 9,
1950).
98. Matter of Wallach v. Finkelstein, 120 N.Y.L.J. 1332, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Nov.
30, 1948).
99. Matter of Britton v. Coster, 122 N.Y.L.J. 454, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 13, 1949);
In re Kapela v. Ross, 120 N.Y.L.J. 144. col. 6 (Sup. Ct. July 26, 1948). The Britton
decision was acquiesced in by the commission. See Item IV d of Minutes of 155th Execu-
tive Commission Meeting, Oct. 25, 1949, supra note 93. Cf. OPA Interpretation 6(b)
(1)-VI, 14 P&F OPA SERvicE 200:2134 (1944).
100. 275 App. Div. 949 (2d Dep't 1949).
101. 276 App. Div. 1009 (1st Dep't 1950).
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apparently could not afford to buy a house. The sale was made to him shortly
after the tenant had applied for a reduction in rent for failure to paint. A
decision, that a finding of lack of good faith was arbitrary and capricious,
was sustained without opinion by the Appellate Division, First Department.
10 2
The basis of the Commission's finding of lack of good faith in both cases
was that the transfers to the children were evasive. The reversals apparently
held that evasive conduct sufficient to support a finding of bad faith was not
established. 10 3 But in neither case did the commission find that the transfers
were not genuine or were less than complete, although on appeal the argument
was made in the Goodmnan case that the mother retained real control of the
premises purportedly sold,10 4 and in the Maklary case that the alleged con-
veyance from father to son was not an arms-length transaction. 0 5 This
suggests that the decisions might have been different in the presence of
definitive findings by the commission on the genuineness of the transfers.
It is not clear, however, that the Appellate Divisions would have considered
the facts in those cases of sufficient circumstantial force to sustain such findings,
and that they would not have insisted on more direct evidence of misrep-
resentation.0 6
The Court of Appeals has not passed on the questions posed by the Goodman
and Maklary cases. Speculation may find the majority Rosenbluth opinion
in concord with the position of those decisions on the question of evasion.
That opinion offers little basis even for conjecture about the Court's attitude




Three interpretations of good faith are suggested by the decisions, judicial
and administrative, on eviction control: (1) Good faith is established if the
landlord, at the time he applies for the tenant's eviction, actually intends to
occupy the quarters involved. When this intent is demonstrated, a showing of
compelling necessity, plus the adequacy of the sought accommodations to relieve
it, are enough to spell out good faith. (2) Good faith is not satisfied, even
though there is an intent to use, unless use is also the dominant motive,
102. The fact that no appeal was attempted from this decision is not to be taken to
mean that the commission agreed with it. Very shortly after it was made, the commis-
sion's life ended with the termination of local controls. See note 90 supra.
103. Cf. the comment of Commissioner Wechsler cited in note 93 supra.
104. See p. 5 of appellants' brief on appeal, supra note 100.
105. See p. 9 of appellants' brief on appeal, supra note 101.
106. Cf. Matter of Vairo v. Coster, 122 N.Y.L.J. 999, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 26,
1949).
107. Perhaps support for such findings may be found in some decisions of comparable
cases made by Judge Froessel, who was on the Court of Appeals when it decided the
Rosenbiuth case, before his elevation to that bench. See the Pfister and Sefarian cases,
supra notes 94 and 96 respectively; cf. the Kapela case, supra note 99.
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unwatered at the time of application by any substantial purpose inconsistent
with the objectives of the controls. (3) Good faith is not confined, in point
of time, to the period when the landlord applies for the tenant's eviction. It
also governs the landlord's conduct prior to the time of application. If in
the proximate past the landlord has engaged in disruptive practices or other
conduct inimical to the purposes of the controls and related to his present
application, he fails to shw good faith even though his sole intent, at the
time he makes his application, is to evict the tenant so as to use the accom-
modations for himself.
The first interpretation too plainly invites frustration of eviction controls,
and has been rejected for that reason. 08 Such support as it can muster in
decided cases appears to depend on dubious construction of ambiguous
language, such as that in the Rosenbhth case, that "The landlord complies
with the statute's demands if he seeks the eviction with the honest intention
and desire to gain possession of the premises for his own use."'019 The decisions,
particularly those outside New York, overwhelmingly prefer the second
interpretation to the first, and it is probable that language of the type
quoted actually represents a loose statement of the former. There has been
little consideration outside New York of the position taken by the third
interpretation. 110 Its blanket rejection within that State is not to be glibly
attributed to the Rosenbluth case."'
The first two interpretations place stress on deceit and misrepresentation
as the crux of lack of good faith. An agency administering eviction controls
of course does not need a good faith requirement to keep from being victimized
by deception or fraud."12 Moreover, under the first two interpretations, the
element of good faith seems to become tautological in that it adds little to the
other requirements already specifically in the exception dealing with eviction
for owner-occupancy. For example, if at the time he applies for the tenant's
eviction the landlord misrepresents his compelling need or his dominant motive,
he fails to meet the specific requirements of necessity and purpose. An inter-
esting commentary in this regard is provided by a pair of cases decided by
108. See Snyder v. Reshenk, 131 Conn. 252, 38 A. 2d 803 (1944). But cf. Matter of
Kelly v. Finkelstein, 120 N.Y.L.J. 406, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 9, 1948).
109. See the Rosenbuth case, supra note 85, 300 N. Y. at 405, 91 N. E. 2d at 582; cf.
Kauffman & Sons Saddlery Co. v. Miller, 298 N. Y. 38, 80 N. E. 2d 322 (1948).
110. Under federal controls, the question of interpreting good faith along these lines
was not likely to arise. There was no compelling necessity requirement for the most part,
see note 50 supra; the restriction against eviction for the benefit of children seemed lax,
see note 59 supra; and there were evasion provisions which might be used in some cases,
see note 5 supra.
111. The court held only that leaving a seller in possession under the circumstances of
that case was not lack of good faith. This is not to say either that other practices of an
evasive nature might not justify a determination of lack of good faith, or that a concept
of good faith which took into account the landlord's conduct prior to the time of his
application would be held per se unreasonable.
112. Cf. Finnegan v. McBride, 226 N. Y. 252, 259, 123 N. E. 374, 376 (1919).
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an appellate court in California. In Bauingarner v. Orton good faith was
defined under OPA controls to mean "honestly, without fraud, collusion or
deceit; really, actually, without pretense."" 3 But in Janise v. Bryan the
same court later found that definition to be "obiter dictum and inaccurate""-
4
if it conflicted with its newly articulated conclusion that" 5
".. . the phrase 'in good faith' is in each case [the District of Columbia
act and the Housing and Rent Acts of 1947 and 1948] immediately
followed by a detailed and definite description of the purpose for
which the landlord must seek possession in order to come within
the exception. The phrase is not needed in any of these exceptions,
to explain the description of the purpose or for mere emphasis. It
can have effect, in the provisions under consideration only by regard-
ing it as adding another element which the landlord must show, in
addition to the required purpose, in order to oust his tenant."
Apart from its substantive content, application of the good faith requirement
by an administrative agency has its effects on procedure. Being dependent
on the particular facts, a determination on good faith may more readily be
held arbitrary on judicial review unless it is made on the basis of a hearing
of the parties." 6  It became the commission's policy to hold hearings in all
good faith cases. 1 7 For purposes of judicial review, moreover, the record
on which the determination is based must include all relevant facts," 8 and
be built to resist any challenge that it is not an accurate compilation of the
evidence before the agency.
The commission's approach to good faith could be given substance only by
application to particular cases. As the commission's experience developed,
however, and persistent fact patterns emerged in good faith cases, the commis-
sion's rule making power could be exercised to articulate the effect of its
approach on these patterns. An example is the provision promulgated in
regard to sellers left in possession." 9 Regulations, to the extent possible, put
in accessible form guides to commission action.120 Moreover, when any ruling
113. 63 Cal. App. 2d 841, 844, 146 P. 2d 67, 69 (1944). This definition has been
widely quoted by the courts.
114. 89 Cal. App. 2d 933, 940, 201 P. 2d 466, 471 (1948).
115. Id. at 936-7, 201 P. 2d at 469.
116. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Barnes, 115 Colo. 30, 33, 168 P. 2d 552, 553 (1946). This
is apart from the question whether a hearing is required as a constitutional matter.
117. See FINAL REPORT 6-8.
118. Cf. Matter of Meyer v. Finkelstein, 275 App. Div. 837 (2d Dep't 1949); FINAL
REPORT 9.
119. See note 84 supra.
120. This was particularly important in a field relatively undeveloped and unserviced
by the facilities which make rules and precedents available in more traditional areas. The
commission was continually besieged by demands for information. Supplying it was not
only fair to the affected parties, but was valuable in easing the problem of enforcement.
See FINAL REPORT 65-6.
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was challenged before the courts, it was useful to have the backing of exercise
of the rule making power.12 1 It was, of course, necessary to be on guard
against the temptation to apply such regulations mechanically. 22
Taking its cue from the urgent aims and stringent character of the controls,
the commission applied a broad interpretation of the meaning of good faith.
In some cases that interpretation was held to exceed its statutory power.
The practices complained of then had to be attacked under the broad pro-
visions, common in eviction controls, conferring power on the executing
agency to curb evasive conduct or to effectuate the purposes of the controls.
Where this did not work, amendment of the underlying law became necessary.
121. Cf. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U. S. 55, 69 (1937); Rogge v.
United States, 128 F. 2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1942). The shoring-up effect undoubtedly was
limited. For example, once the commission's ruling in the Rosen bluth case was termed
"fiat" by the Court of Appeals, it is questionable that it would have been fiat any the less
if it had been propped by a regulation.
122. See FINAL REPORT 14.
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